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De facto states are notorious for their pariah status, constant security deficit, and 
embryonic institutions, producing the perception that they are states-in-the-making 
perpetually striving for sheer survival. Their reliance on a patron is considered proof 
that they would not be viable states and thus are incapable of having independent 
agency. Without the freedom of choice, these entities lack deliberate will for action, and 
without capacity to do, they can hardly be in a position of exerting power. A focus on 
agency allows us to ask how far and in what ways these unrecognized entities have been 
able to act in the international system. We demonstrate that, despite their limited 
capacity, de facto states do display some agency, and that their foreign policy choices are 
sometimes not remarkably different from recognized small states or micro-states. Even 
imperfect agency may bring relief for local policymakers who are supposed to alleviate 
anarchy and chaos in their daily practices. The international community, we argue, 
should thus be more accommodating to de facto states; if their agency is continuously 
denied, they will be both increasingly reliant on their patron and separated from the 
international community. 
 
Agents of Secessionist Cause 
 
A telling aspect of the level of agency relates to whether de facto states are able to 
participate in the processes related to the management or resolution of conflict, which in 
most cases they see as leading to independent statehood or bolstering the status quo. 
Are these processes unfolding with their direct participation, or are they completely 
sidelined? 
 
Negotiations offer de facto states some opportunities to assert their agency. The costliest 
option would be if they refuse to participate, or to threaten leaving the talks as a way to 
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show that they simply hold the power to do so. An example of the latter is Somaliland in 
2000-2012 where the law prohibited representatives of the government or private 
citizens from attending conferences about Somalia, with attendance being “a treasonable 
offense.” Or de facto states might participate in conferences for so-called “devious 
objectives,” or for indirect benefits such as stalling to gain time for reorganization or 
avoiding concessions that might undermine their positions. Yet, often, de facto states are 
eager to participate in negotiations for the air of acknowledgment it creates. 
 
In some cases, it is international pressure that binds parties to a negotiation process. 
Most notably, the EU’s conditionality policies keep Kosovo and Serbia locked in a 
process that showcases how external supporters can bolster the claims of a de facto state, 
thus increasing the de facto state’s leverage of being an agent of a secessionist cause. At 
the same time, the “Cypriot owned, Cypriot led” peace talks demonstrated that 
Northern Cyprus can be seen as a “state” acting independently (no less so than the 
internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus) on negotiation issues ranging from 
territorial adjustments and security guarantees to constitutional arrangements of the 
potential new state. 
 
Taiwan’s agency was especially significant during the rule of President Ma Ying-jeou 
(2008-2016), when several agreements were signed and when the leaders of China and 
Taiwan met in person for the first time in over60 years in November 2015. 
Notwithstanding, Somalia’s manifest failure to establish a viable state has not hindered 
its ability to act internationally; it has been successfully denying Somaliland’s freedom 
of choice and prevented it from engaging with the international community. 
 
Among the post-Soviet de facto states, Transnistria has a privileged seat at the so-called 
“5+2” talks. The involvement of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the multilateral Geneva 
International Discussions was in a more limited capacity; Georgia refused to 
acknowledge the territories as direct parties to the conflict, arguing that they are under 
Russian occupation. From the other end of the continuum, Nagorno-Karabakh has been 
completely excluded from the multilateral Minsk Group talks, while its relations with 
Azerbaijan are virtually non-existent. 
 
These accounts reveal that negotiations present parent states with serious dilemmas. In 
order to have negotiations, one needs to acknowledge the existence of the other side, 
and the validity of its claims. When negotiation positions are diametrically opposing, 
with one side oriented toward reintegration and the other toward secession, the process 
develops into a stalemate. Common to all these negotiation cases is a tendency that 
doing something does not necessarily bring de facto states closer to international 
recognition; however, their chance of being an agent of something increases. 
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Capacity to Do 
 
The failure to gain external recognition does not mean that the one seeking it does not 
have any capacity or will to act independently. This can, occasionally, lead to tensions 
between a de facto state and its patron. A good example of such friction was the public 
exchange of words between the presidents of Northern Cyprus and Turkey in April 
2015, when Northern Cypriot President Mustafa Akinci claimed that it was time to 
rethink the nature of their relations and Turkish President Recep Erdoğan retorted, “Do 
his ears hear what he says?” For their part, people in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and 
Transnistria have, at times, rejected the Kremlin’s preferred candidates in elections for 
high positions. They do so out of worry that the patron might hold too much sway in 
local politics, although, in reality, no local politician could propose a strong reorientation 
away from their territory’s chief patron. 
 
Engagement with a secessionist entity depends more on geopolitical context than 
specific agency. While there is not much de facto states can do to affect changes and 
preferences at the highest of political levels, they are not completely agentless when one 
includes various types of cross-border engagements. Moreover, de facto states imitate 
the institutional set-up of confirmed states: they have developed their own foreign 
affairs ministries and appointed special representatives and honorary consuls. Their 
high-ranking officials have been guests in states that do not officially recognize them. 
For example, the president of Nagorno-Karabakh often has working visits to the United 
States, France, and Russia, as all three are observers in the Minsk Group. The president 
of Transnistria delivered a speech at the Oxford Union in June 2017, while the deputy 
prime minister/minister of foreign affairs of Northern Cyprus held several meetings in 
New York in September 2018, which included bilateral talks with representatives of 
different countries.  
 
The aim of foreign representatives from de facto states is to keep the host state 
communities interested in their cause (especially if the host state also has a significant 
diaspora presence), and advocate for bottom-up recognition through grassroots 
engagement. Nagorno-Karabakh and Somaliland are de facto states that, thanks to their 
relatively large and widespread diasporas, have been able to utilize these connections to 
raise funds, for example for infrastructural improvements.2 This kind of help is not 
available for all de facto states and is not usually in the amounts required, thus 
prompting them to turn to their patron states to cover budget holes and further develop 
their institutions. However, any external help that they receive from their patrons 
henceforth opens the way for international criticism that the patron will have de facto 
control over the de facto state’s domestic politics. 
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While this is certainly true to some extent, again, the real picture is far more nuanced. 
For example, the United States has provided military security in the form of weapons 
sales to Taiwan, but has little involvement in Taiwanese day-to-day politics. Kosovo, on 
the other hand, has experienced far more direct and varied U.S. involvement through 
donor money poured into the country after 1999; there is still a lot of kowtowing to 
international donors and organizations evident in Kosovar politics, with legislation 
often demonstrably influenced by the language of international norms and rights. Still, 
the direct influence of a patron is far more observable in the case of Northern Cyprus, 
and especially so in the cases of post-Soviet de facto states. 
 
With the exception of Taiwan, de facto states have struggled considerably with 
institution-building and access to foreign markets. Without previous governance 
experience, they have built their capacity largely from scratch, with limited access to 
requisite know-how and external assistance. While trading with de facto states is often 
limited and cumbersome, it is not entirely impossible, and represents another way in 
which de facto states can display their capacity to do. For instance, Transnistria is able to 
export its goods to the EU through Moldova’s Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreement as long as its businesses are registered in Moldova. Taiwan, on the other 
hand, is a full democracy, belongs to the top 30 largest economies, and has a global 
network of trade partners. 
 
Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and South Ossetia rely on their patron states to train their 
diplomats and public servants, and in some cases receive seconded officials. In return 
for its support, the patron expects a combination of assets such as “ideological 
convergence, international solidarity, and strategic advantage.” After being recognized 
by Russia in 2008, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are increasingly locked into cooperation 
agreements that allow Russia to exert more control over their everyday domestic affairs. 
Abkhazia, however, has not alleviated its restrictions on selling land to foreigners, 
including Russians. For its part, Nagorno-Karabakh has been unofficially run by its 
patron state Armenia. Of note, two former Armenian presidents, Robert Kocharyan and 
Serzh Sargsyan, both hail from Nagorno-Karabakh.  
 
De Facto States as Imperfect Agents 
 
De facto states have a variety of ways to display their agency by, for example, 
negotiating over their statuses, showcasing their capacity to act through forging 
economic cooperation arrangements, opening representation offices, or simplifying 
access for tourists. Some factors influencing the extent of their activities are familiar to 
all small states: the simple lack of people-power and monetary resources to develop 
large-scale bureaucracies. Other factors, however, are more specific to de facto states, 
such as being born out of conflict situations and having international boycotts placed on 
them. 
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By arguing that de facto states themselves do not have agency, they are dismissed as 
entities that cannot be taken seriously. However, expecting full agency from de facto 
states in an age where no state can actually claim to have it entirely, points to hypocrisy. 
All the more so when the European microstates of Andorra, Liechtenstein, and Monaco 
have each developed arrangements with their neighboring states over the last few 
centuries that give their neighbors some degree of control over their affairs—a self-
limiting of their own freedom of choice. Yet all of them are able to interact with other 
states on an equal basis. 
 
Maintaining some sort of patronage has been especially commonplace in the context of 
decolonization, where former colonizers have often retained their military presence and 
interfered with internal politics when deemed necessary. The United States has forced 
its military presence or its international relations posture on a number of small states 
while making aid and loans contingent on compliance, and tying these states—such as 
the “hybrid jurisdictions” of Palau, the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of 
Micronesia—into a relationship of dependence where much relies on the goodwill of the 
more powerful partner. 
 
Conclusions 
 
We claim that the international community needs a more accommodative approach to 
de facto states and that acknowledging their agency, however fragmented and flawed, 
will contribute to a better-managed co-existence for them. When a de facto state’s agency 
is continuously denied—as is the case with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which unlike 
Nagorno-Karabakh have no effective diasporas to fall back on—it will lead to a vicious 
circle of increasing reliance on the patron and to their ever-increasing seclusion from the 
international system. 
 
In the end, all states can have their capacity to do undermined by different arrangements 
and considerations. But once a state has gained international recognition, the limitations 
placed on its agency are paradoxically considered another part of their right to do: a 
recognized state has full agency to enter into relations that constrain its ability to act as it 
wishes to the point of entering into unions with other states. In doing that, capacity 
proof loses its face value as a signifier of agency: de facto states’ capacity to do is not 
constrained by the lack of agency, as is often proposed, but by the non-recognition of 
their right to do. 
 
 
 
© PONARS Eurasia 2019. The statements made and views expressed are 
solely the responsibility of the author. PONARS Eurasia is an international 
network of scholars advancing new approaches to research on security, 
politics, economics, and society in Russia and Eurasia. PONARS Eurasia is 
based at the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES) at 
the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. 
This publication was made possible in part by a grant from Carnegie 
Corporation of New York.  www.ponarseurasia.org 
